‘Computational thinking’ (CT) is highlighted in research literature, societal debates, and educational policies alike as being of prime significance in the 21st century. It is currently being introduced into K–12 (primary and secondary education) curricula around the world. However, there is no consensus on what exactly CT consists of, which skills it involves, and how it relates to programming. This article pinpoints four competing claims as to what constitutes the defining traits of CT. For each of the four claims, inherent (...) philosophical presuppositions are identified concerning the nature of thinking, problem-solving, and human–computer relationships. It is argued that most of these philosophical presuppositions are very similar to ones that Hubert Dreyfus and Donald Schön addressed forty to fifty years ago. Therefore, claims about the power of CT raise old discussions in a new disguise. Dreyfus and Schön argued that the presuppositions were wrong. Do their arguments hold and thus defeat contemporary claims about CT? Alternatively, has the technological development since the time of their writings proven them wrong? This article argues that it is necessary to heed the arguments of Dreyfus, Schön, and—later—Bent Flyvbjerg to ensure that CT curricula are built in accord with the value-rational nature of human practice, rather than on misconceived rationalizations of problem-solving, computer use, and computational aspects in the world. However, the pervasive integration of information technology in today's world raises new issues concerning human–machine collaborations that sidetrack the arguments of Dreyfus and Schön. A revised view of CT is required which focusses on articulating how humans can design for, partake in, and critically appraise human–machine collaborations. (shrink)

Reflection is an ambiguous buzzword in contemporary educational and professional settings. Work has been done to clarify the concept theoretically, but a gap remains between such clarifications and actual reflective activities in educational and work-related practices. Reflective activities embody epistemological presuppositions about the nature of competence, knowledge, and learning, and about the relation between thinking, communicating, and acting. In this article, Nina Bonderup Dohn identifies the epistemological presuppositions of two paradigm cases of reflection (“solitaire reflection” and “communicative reflection”) and assesses (...) these against a view of knowledge, competence, learning, and action inspired by the Scandinavian interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy as well as by insights from phenomenology and situated learning. The outcome of Dohn's assessment is that the presuppositions of the paradigm cases are misguided and, therefore, so are the reflective activities. The problems and pitfalls that result from this situation are identified and illustrated with empirical examples. Dohn concludes by suggesting an alternative paradigm: “situated reflection.”. (shrink)

Abstract: This article aims at elucidating the ways in which philosophy may engage in cooperation with other disciplines through “philosophy with” (Hansson 2008). An exemplary investigation is undertaken of the roles of epistemology in investigating knowledge, that is, how epistemology may interact with sciences concerned with knowledge. Four possible roles are distinguished: provider of a priori conceptual analyses, clarifier of scientific concepts and their implications, interpreter of scientific results, and dialogue partner with a voice of its own. Each role is (...) illustrated by contemporary texts, and it is argued that the role of dialogue partner is the most fruitful. (shrink)

This article gives a critique of the methodology of OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). It is argued that PISA is invalidated by the fact that the methodology chosen does not constitute an adequate operationalisation of the question of inquiry. Therefore, contrary to the claims of PISA, PISA is not an assessment of the ‘knowledge and skills for life’ of students, but only of ‘knowledge and skills in assessment situations’. Even this latter form of assessment is not fully reliable, (...) however, because of problems at the level of concrete test items and because of an inherent confusion of relative and absolute evaluation. (shrink)